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This paper analyzes the dynamics of women’s participation in the decisions made in the household 
by looking at the effects of events that transpired in the recent period. Results suggest that the 
wife’s participation status is positively affected by the presence of parents, either hers or the 
spouse’, in the household. Results also show that the wife’s parents significantly affect 
participation in minor issues while the spouse’s parents significantly affect the more relevant 
financial issues. The paper also offers a cursory discussion on the role of household headship. 
 
  
I. Introduction  
While empirical research explaining women’s participation in household decision making 
abound, studies done along these lines remain relatively scant in the Philippines. Some inquiries 
have already been  done by Bayudan (2006), Morgan, Stash, Smith and Mason (2002) and Hindin 
and Adair (2002), but these studies are based on cross section data and are therefore mainly 
concerned with the determinants of women’s role in the household. In recent years, dynamic 
analyses have been at the forefront of understanding social issues such as poverty. An analysis is 
yet to be done on the dynamics of intrahousehold decisions, however.  
 
While the scope for policy intervention is not as big as in the case for poverty, understanding the 
nature of events that potentially affects the chances of gaining foothold on household decisions is 
an interesting research in its own right. First, at the macroeconomic level, the Philippines is 
committed to the Millennium Development Goal of gender equality. Based on the 2006 Human 
Development Report, the country’s Gender Development Index and Gender Empowerment 
Measure have improved between 2002 and 2004. While this is encouraging, the report has 
acknowledged that these do not necessarily translate to improvements in women’s roles and 
status. Since these indicators are highly aggregated, dynamic studies conducted at the household 
level will provide complementary perspectives concerning the status of women. Second, to the 
extent that the well being of women affects the welfare of children, a serious analysis of 
situations that affect women’s roles in the household is considered vital in understanding how 
children’s welfare can be improved. 
 
The paper aims to examine the determinants of the Filipinas’ participation in household decision 
making domains. This will be done using the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey 
(CLHNS), a panel dataset that has been collected in the Southern part of the Philippines. Cebu is 
included in the Central Visayas (RegionVII) and poverty statistics computed by the National 
Statistical Coordination Board indicate that the poverty incidence for the years 1997, 2000 and 
2003 are 30, 32 and 24 percent, respectively. These are slightly higher compared to the overall 
poverty incidence in the country at 28, 28 and 25 per cent. However, among the Visayas regions, 
Central Visayas has the lowest poverty incidence. Western Visayas (Region VI) has 37, 37 and 
32 per cent and Eastern Visayas (Region VIII) has 40, 38 and 36 per cent.  
 
Some correlates of poverty at the household level are presented in table 2a in the on-line 
appendix. Figures indicate that the average wife’s educational attainment in the CLHNS samples 
is at the primary level although the proportion of women with this level of education has 
decreased overtime. Similar trends can be observed for Central Visayas in the Demographic and 
Household Survey (DHS), a survey data conducted at the national level. While most of the 
CLHNS samples have listed well water as the main water supply, well water users have decreased 
from 1998 to 2002. Many CLHNS households use toilet pit latrine while many DHS samples use 
flush toilet. The proportion of households with electricity is higher in the CLHNS than in the 
DHS, however. Similar observations can be said about the ownership of television, refrigerator 
and bicycle and the proportion of CLHNS households with these durable goods are increasing 
overtime.  
 
Background on marriage and family formation in the Philippines 
The interplay of various factors has shaped the Filipina’s role in the family and society today. 
Prior to the Spanish colonization, customary laws in the Philippines have established gender 
equality and have given women the right to own and inherit property and engage in trade 
(Medina, 2001). The country’s laws on marriage and family reflect Spanish influences, the most 
pervasive of which are the Catholic teachings. Divorce is not allowed since marriage is taught to 
be a sacrament and the family is considered to be the most basic institution. Social norms are 
against cohabitation, premarital sex and prenuptial childbearing. Children born outside of 
marriage will not undergo baptism, another sacrament, unless parents go through counseling. 
Intra – familial marriages up to the fourth degree are not allowed in the Philippines. Compared to 
South or East Asian countries where joint or stem family household is idealised, conjugal 
household is emphasised in the Southeast Asian nations (Mason, 1997). The law also stipulates 
that all properties acquired during the course of marriage are jointly owned by both husband and 
wife. Women are therefore protected from sudden poverty in cases of unfortunate events such as 
loss of a husband or marriage breakdown.  
 
Partly due to customary laws and the widespread influence of Catholic teachings on family laws 
and social norms, women in the Philippines have greater autonomy compared to women from the 
rest of Asia. Although some studies claim that the Filipinas are still afforded lower social status 
despite favorable social norms  (Williams and Domingo, 1993), increasing evidence in recent 
years point to the Filipinas gaining a foothold in the majority of household decision making 
domains (Upadhyay and Hindin, 2007; Hindin and Adair, 2002).  
 
The church teaching that wives should obey their husbands also finds its way to how household 
headship is determined. Males are typically viewed as the heads of the family in line with “the 
husband is the pillar and the wife is the light” roles. Unless clarified by the enumerator, 
respondents would typically designate male members as heads in surveys. In this sense, the 
assignment of headship is somewhat nominal. Some would equate headship to the ability to 
provide for the family. 
 
Literature on women’s status in the household 
While there is a substantial literature on women’s status, issues pertaining thereto are usually 
discussed either within the context of region or religion. This is because women’s autonomy, and 
possibly the lack thereof, is often associated with the prevailing social system and norms that are 
shared by nations in similar geographic locations. Studies on women’s autonomy and its effect on 
outcomes concerning women are mostly conducted using South Asian data.
1
 There are also 
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 See for example, Jejeebhoy (1991), Vlassof (1991), Murthi, Guio and Dreze (1995), Dharmalingam and Morgan 
(1996) and Bloom, Wypij and das Gupta (2001) for India, Balk (1994) and Schuler and Hashemi (1994) for Bangladesh 
and Jejeebhoy and Sathar (2001) for Pakistan). Results from these studies indicate that women’s high status in the 
household, regardless of how it is measured, has positive effects on women’s involvement in reproductive decisions. 
studies done within the context of religion, social and cultural structure. Kinship (Dyson and 
Moore, 1983), patriarchy (Malhotra, Vanneman and Kishor, 1995), changes in the household 
organizations and women’s socioeconomic status (Gage, 1995; Hogan, Bernahu and 
Hailemariam, 1999) are found to affect fertility and contraceptive use.
2
 A number of studies on 
the effect of women’s status on children’s health outcomes have also been written in the recent 
years (Hindin and Adair, 2000; Simon et al, 2002).  
  
 
There are very few researches that provide empirical substantiation on women’s status in the 
Philippines (Morgan et al. (2002) within the context of religion; Hindin and Adair (2002) for 
intimate partner violence; Bayudan (2006) for time allocation). These studies have shown that 
woman’s autonomy has a positive effect on the outcomes being studied.  However, such 
researches are done using cross section data, which is deficient in understanding household 
processes and events that are typically dynamic in nature. For example, a breakdown of family 
ties, such as divorce, is a household reality that may happen due to the confluence of factors and 
events that happen over time. Assuming away strong tendencies towards norms such as those 
imposed by patriarchal culture, intrahousehold gender relations are results of interactions over a 
long period of time that reveal the preferences of husbands and wives and enhance the symmetry 
of information available to them.
3
  
 
Using recent CLHNS datasets, the effects of attributes and changes in these attributes are 
analyzed with a particular focus on the effects of the changes in demographic composition. While 
some studies (Bloom et al, 2001; Jeffery et al, 1988) find that women’s status in India are 
enhanced by their proximity to their natal kin, our results indicate that the presence of both the 
parents and parents-in-law in the Southern Philippines’ household is a positive factor on women’s 
participative and interactive role. This is explained within the context of norms on family 
formation and filial support. 
 
This paper is organised as follows: Section two discusses the empirical strategy in terms of data 
source and estimation issues and methods. This section also discusses several aspects of 
intrahousehold decisions, variable definitions, notational conventions and data limitations. 
Section three provides some trends in household decision making. Section four discusses the 
results. Tthe last section concludes.   
 
II. Empirical strategy 
Data source, sample and limitations 
The paper will use the Cebu Longitudinal Health and Nutrition Survey (CLHNS), a dataset 
collected in the Southern Philippines.
4
 Anticipating the data requirement, the paper will use the 
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 The influx of studies in a recurring theme of fertility outcomes is due to the desire to curb poverty in LDCs by 
reducing the population growth rate. Where women exert control in the conduct of their lives, they have the power to 
influence fertility as well (Jejeebhoy, 1991; Balk, 1994; Abadian, 1996; Dharmalingam and Morgan, 1996). 
3
 This line of inquiry is stressed in bargaining models found in Fortin and Lacroix (1997) and Browning and Chiappori 
(1998) where household relations are analyzed within a repeated and cooperative bargaining framework. Within this 
context, the empirical literature has used sex ratio and divorce laws (Chiappori et al, 2002), asset ownership and 
property rights (Quisumbing and Maluccio, 2003) and human capital brought to marriage (Browning et al., 1994; 
Aronsson, 2001; Vermeulen, 2005) as measures of bargaining power. The general findings emphasise the role of 
individually assigned assets on the women’s ability to participate on household outcomes. 
4
 See appendix I for further information on the survey data. 
 
2002 and 2005 data on the intrahousehold issues even though most of these are also collected in 
the 1994 survey wave. This makes the dataset semi longitudinal and this possibly deprives the 
analysis of other explanatory variables which can be found in the earlier surveys. However, there 
are some plausible reasons for the exclusion of the 1994 survey.  First, a temporal difference of 
eight years is quite long. An employed husband in both 1994 and 2002 could have been moving 
in and out of the work force within the period. To the extent that husband’s employment status 
affects the wife’s participation in intrahousehold decisions, the dynamics that has taken place in 
between is an important element for analysis but is unfortunately unobserved. Second, the context 
in which the 1994 issues are decided on could have drastically changed overtime. For example, 
the purchase of major appliances in recent periods has become easier due to deferred payment 
schemes over a long period of time with low or zero penalties, a practice that has not yet 
substantially proliferated in the early 1990s. With these promotions, couples are likely to agree on 
the purchase and both husband and wife will be recorded as the final decision makers. To bypass 
this concern, the study is therefore limited to recent periods when the context remains more or 
less similar. Samples are also selected such that the issues are decided on both periods to create a 
balanced panel data.  
 
Areas of intrahousehold decisions, variable definitions and some notations 
At the core of the CLHNS module are information on how intrahousehold issues have been 
handled and resolved. The wife is the respondent in the said module. Issues included are the 
purchase of shoes for herself, clothes for the children, gifts for relatives, land and major 
appliances, what school the children should go to, whether to consult the doctor for a sick child, 
what family planning method to use and how to spend her money.  For each of these issues, the 
following question is asked: Has the respondent/household ever made decision on (issue)?This is 
answerable by either yes or no. The wife is then asked Whose decision on (issue) prevailed?The 
respondent will then identify the person that becomes the final decision maker.  The issue on the 
control over household money is taken from the question Who would respondent say really 
controls the money that they have as a couple?  For the estimation below, the responses are coded 
P when the final decision rests on either the wife alone, the wife and the husband or the wife and 
other family members and N when the final decision rests on either the husband alone or the 
husband and other family members.  
 
For the husband’s income remittance, the wife is asked If respondent’s spouse is working, does he 
give respondent the money he earns?The wife then answers either no or yes (all) or yes 
(proportion).  For estimation purposes, the response is coded P when the answer is yes (regardless 
whether full or partial remittance) and N when the answer is no.  
 
Throughout the text, t refers to the year 2002 and t+3 refers to the year 2005. 
 
Estimation method and data set up 
Logit regression is used to analyze the effects of personal and household attributes on women’s 
participation in the household decision making. The Logit model is based on the cumulative 
logistic probability function given by iXi p
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regressions are binary indicators that are coded P and N for each of the issue discussed above.  
 
The Logit regression is widely used for analyzing poverty and income dynamics such as those 
found in Jarvis (1997), Jenkins (2002) and Finnie and Sweetman (2003). Assuming proper data 
set up, the entry to and exit from a particular state are analyzed by limiting the sample to relevant 
cohorts. Given the paper’s objective of identifying events that lead to changes in the state of the 
woman’s participation in the resolution of intrahousehold issues, logit regression would have 
been a suitable method. However, preliminary data analysis indicates that only a small portion of 
the sample remains when the relevant cohorts for the analysis of entry or exit are considered for 
balanced panel data. Due to these restricted samples, the preliminary maximization of the 
likelihood function using Logit regression always fails. The Multinomial Logit model is therefore 
used to analyze the effects of changes in personal attributes and events on the probability of 
being in a particular state of decision making participation.  Given the data, the following discrete 
nominal outcomes are created: 0, not part of the final decision makers in both periods; 1, part of 
the decision maker at time t but not at time t+3; 2, not part of the decision makers at time t but 
part at time t+3; 3, part of the decision makers in both periods. The probability that the wife is in 
a particular state is given by 

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While other estimators for discrete outcomes are available like the Ordered Probit to understand 
wife’s autonomy in the Philippines (see for example Bayudan, 2006), the Multinomial Logit is 
more appropriate since the data are extracted from the module that does not ask the respondents 
for rankings in relation to their preferences on how various decisions are made. Instead, 
respondents are asked if the issue has been decided in the household and if it is, who are the 
decision makers and whose decision ultimately prevails. Based on these information, it is not easy 
to assume that wives will have a higher utility from being in state   3j  than in 2j  since 
there are issues for which the wife or the other major household decision maker may be 
indifferent to. Husbands may not be part of the decision making on issues such as buying gifts for 
relatives or items for the children because the wives typically have the better information on 
preferences, availability of the merchandise and local prices.  
 
Aggregate measures pertaining to household issues are also constructed using the score generated 
by the principal component analysis (PCA).  The PCA score is generated using all the issues 
enumerated above. PCA scores are also generated for three categories: minor issues consisting of 
buying shoes for herself, clothes for the children and gifts for the relatives, major issues including 
where to send the child for school, seeing a doctor for a sick child, what family planning method 
to use, buying land and major appliances and finance composed of issues such as husband’s 
income remittance, the decision makers on her earnings and who controls the household money.  
A binary variable is then created equal to 1 (P) if the PCA score is greater than zero to represent 
high participation in household decision making and 0 (N) otherwise. Similar to the construction 
above, The values of the dependent variable in the Multinomial Logit are based on the following 
combinations, namely,  00 (NN), 10 (PN), 01 (NP) and 11 (PP) at time t and t+3 for 3,2,1,0j , 
respectively.   
 
Endogeneity of work status and living arrangements 
In the literature of wage and income inequality, studies by Heckman (1976) and Behrman and 
Wolfe (1984) indicate that women’s labor force participation is affected by personal attributes 
and social roles and is therefore treated as an endogenous variable. Within the context of the 
current research, treating the work status of both husband and wife as endogenous is also a 
necessary step to avoid the sample selection bias introduced by the fact that the unobservable 
attributes determining labor force participation may also determine the propensity to participate in 
household decision making.To do this, the presence of a baby in the household is used as an 
instrumental variable. Following the literature on the use of instrumental variable technique (see 
for example Beegle et al., 2004), the validity of the instrument depends on its relevance (induces 
variation in the labor force participation), its exogeneity and the validity of imposed exclusion 
restrictions (affects intrahousehold issues only through labor force participation).
5
 As shown in 
table 3a in the on-line appendix, results indicate that the baby’s presence does not have a 
significant effect on 2005 outcomes such as wife’s headship, household income and the presence 
of parents/parent/s-in-law in the household. The presence of a baby three years earlier does not 
significantly affect intrahousehold issues in 2005 as well. These evidence provide empirical 
support for the validity of the presence of a baby as a plausible instrument for labor force 
participation.  
 
Living arrangements with parents can be an outcome of household decision making as well. To 
check for the correlation of the residuals of the household issue and the presence of parents in the 
household, the conditional mixed process in Stata is used.
6
 As shown in table 4a in the on-line 
appendix, the correlation coefficients are not statistically significant in almost all of the household 
issues considered. These indicate that the unobserved attributes that determine the wife’s 
participation in household issues are not related to the unobserved characteristics governing the 
presence of either the wife’s or spouse’s parents in the household. This allows us to use the 
uninstrumented presence of the wife’s and the spouse’s parents as explanatory variables in the 
estimation below. 
 
III. Trends 
Decision makers in 2002 and 2005 
Table 5a in the on-line appendix tabulates the distribution of decision makers in 2002 and 2005 
by household issues. The following notations are adopted: W for the wife, S for the spouse or 
other household members, C for both wife and spouse and Z for wife and others. Pairwise 
combinations are formed, with the first letter representing the decision makers in 2002 and the 
second representing the decision makers in 2005.  
Figures in table 5a indicate that a large sample of wives participate in minor issues, either as 
participants in both years or in collaboration with the spouse or other household members. The 
distribution of decision makers with respect to major issues is more dispersed, though. For issues 
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 Discussion of the plausibility of the presence of a baby in the household can be found in appendix III. 
 
6
 This is an estimator that allows the simultaneous estimation of equations with different types of dependent variables 
(i.e. dichotomous, continuous).  
 
such as children’s school, doctor consultation and family planning method, a large portion of the 
wives have indicated to be the sole decision makers for both periods (WW). Although 
collaboration in both years (CC) appears to be the practice of five to nine per cent of the sample, 
there is a shift towards a collaborative decision making between husband and wife in the recent 
year. With the husband, the wife or others as the sole decision maker in 2002, around 21 per cent 
have indicated that issues are decided by both husband and wife in 2005 (WC and SC 
combinations). In the recent year, around 15 to 18 percent of wives are accounted for by SW and 
CW combinations. 
For the purchase of land or major appliances, a small percentage of wives are the sole final 
decision makers in both periods. While 26 to 27 per cent of the sample manifests joint decisions, 
the percentage of wives who indicated collaboration with husbands on the purchase of big ticket 
items in both periods is around eight to 12 per cent. Around 16 per cent indicated that the spouse 
is the sole decision maker in the purchase of appliances and 20 per cent for the purchase of land. 
13 to 15 per cent of the samples have indicated that they became the sole decision maker only in 
the recent period.  
Looking at financial issues, a very large portion of the wives have exercised full control of 
earnings. Half of the sample also indicated they have the full control over the household income 
in both periods while around 14 per cent has shifted to joint control of income in 2005. In terms 
of husband’s remittance of earnings, 60 per cent of the sample indicated that they received their 
husband’s earnings in full, 14 per cent indicated a downgrade of remittance either from full to 
partial or partial to none and 13 per cent indicated an upgrade either from partial to full or none to 
full. 
 
 
 
Rates of Exit from and entry to participation state 
Table 5b in the on-line appendix shows the entry and exit rate. Entry to participation state is 
computed as the number of women who are nonparticipants in 2002 but are participants in 2005 
divided by the number of participant women at 2002. The exit rate from participation state is 
computed as the number of participant women in 2002 but not in 2005 divided by the number of 
nonparticipant women in 2002. 
 
Results indicate that for individual issues, the entry rate is higher except for the purchase of 
children’s clothes and is substantially higher with respect to the purchase of big ticket items.   
 
Entry and exit rates are also computed for aggregate indicators based on the principal component 
analysis. The entry rate is higher than the exit rate except for the issue of finance and is 
substantially higher for major issues.  
 
Attributes, events and status of participation 
From table 5c in the on-line appendix, figures indicate that most of the samples are from the city 
and regardless of urbanity, there is a higher percentage of women who are in the NP state 
compared to the PN state for all issues. Majority of wives are younger than their husbands. There 
is a higher percentage of wives in the NP state with respect to major issues while on the issue of 
finance, there is a higher percentage of wives in the PN state. In addition, more than half of the 
sample consists of women whose educational attainment is either at the elementary or high school 
level. A similar trend can be observed regarding the spouse’s educational attainment. Regardless 
of the spouse’ educational attainment, there is a higher percentage of wives in the NP state for 
major issues while there is a higher percentage of wives in the PN state on the issue of finance. 
There are relatively more wives whose parents’ educational attainments are either at the 
elementary or high school level. Regardless of the parent’s educational attainment, there is a 
higher percentage of wives in the NP state on major issues while there is a higher percentage of 
wives in the PN state on the issue of finance. 
 
Majority of households in the sample has not experienced changes in household headship over the 
two year period and the husband headship is the predominant structure. For those who 
experienced a shift to husband headship, there is a higher percentage of women to be in the NP 
state for major issues.  Changes in the working status of both husband and wife have shown 
interesting patterns as well. Compared to PN, there is a higher percentage of women in the NP 
state when they moved from nonworking to working status for minor and major issues while 
higher percentage of women are in the PN state when there is no change in their labor market 
participation. Whether the husband has become employed or unemployed in 2005, there is a 
higher percentage of women in PN for the issue of finance. 
 
Majority of the households do not live with the wife’s parent/s. However, there is a higher 
percentage of women in the NP state when their parent/s live with them in both periods for all and 
major issues. For women whose parents have moved out in 2005, there is a higher percentage of 
women in the PN on major issues and the issue of finance. Similarly, majority of the households 
do not live with the husband’s parent/s in both periods but for those who do, there is a higher 
percentage of women in the NP state. When the parent/s-in-law moved out in 2005, there is a 
higher percentage of women in the PN for all issues except the major ones.  
 
 
IV. Results and discussion 
Specific household issues: effects of attributes 
The probabilities based on the Logit regression estimates are reported in panel 1 of table 1. Using 
uninstrumented work status, results indicate that working increases the probability of 
participating in all issues considered except family planning method. It has the biggest effect on 
the issue of purchasing major appliances. On the other hand, the husband’s work status decreases 
the chances of the wives’ participation in issues such as child’ school, doctor consultation for sick 
child, purchase of land and hiring of household help.  
 
As presented in panel 2 of table 1, results based on instrumented work status
7
 indicate that the 
high probability of a working wife does not have a statistically significant effect on participation 
in intrahousehold issues considered except for school choice. While the effect of the husband’s 
work status remains negative, it is lower than the effect of the uninstrumented work status. To the 
extent that people’s leadership qualities increase the chance of labor market participation and 
these uncontrolled attributes are the same characteristics that determine their ability to participate 
in household issues, uninstrumented work status is expected to have a larger effect than the one 
estimated with instruments. This result is in line with Horowitz and Wang (2004). Figures also 
indicate that the levels of statistical significance or signs corresponding to the other explanatory 
variables are not affected by the use of the instrumented work status. The magnitude of the 
probabilities is not significantly altered as well. These reinforce the validity of the instrument 
used. To the extent that the presence of a baby in the household positively affects the presence of 
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 A Probit regression on the wife’s labor force participation is run against the dummy for the presence of a baby in the 
household, occupation dummies and highest grade completed of her mother and occupation dummies and highest grade 
completed of her father. Similar set of variables pertaining to the husband’s parental attributes are also used for the 
husband’s labor force participation. The probabilities of positive outcomes are then predicted for both husband and 
wife. 
 
the extended family, its effect is likely to be picked up by higher probabilities associated with the 
presence of wife or husband’s parent/s in the household. Comparison of figures show that the 
difference in the probabilities ranges from zero to one per cent.  
 
In addition, the effect of household nonwage income as proxy for household economic status is 
also explored but results shown in tables 6a to 6c in the on-line appendix, indicate that its effect is 
statistically insignificant and its exclusion from the set of explanatory variables does not lead to 
any material changes in the coefficients of the other independent variables. The subsequent 
discussions are therefore based on results pertaining to instrumented work status and without 
household nonwage income. 
 
As shown in panel 2 of table 1, results indicate that the presence of the wife’s parent/s in the 
household increases the probability of the wife deciding on issues such as child’s school choice, 
doctor consultation for a sick child, purchase of big ticket items and remittance of husband’s 
income. The presence of husband’s parents in the household increases the probability of the wife 
as part of the final decision makers on issues such as doctor consultation and family planning 
method. The wife having higher educational attainment than the husband increases the probability 
of wife’s participation in deciding on issues such as family planning method, purchase of big 
ticket items and control over the household money. The spouse or other household members as 
household head decreases the probability, on the other hand.  
 
Panel 3 of table 1 explores the effects of gender and number mix of children in the household and 
its interaction with the presence of grandparents in the household. Compared to the results shown 
in panel 2 of table 1, panel 3 indicates that the presence of grandparents in the household does not 
have any significant effect on most of the intrahousehold issues. Similar observations can be said 
regarding the interactions of grandparents with the number of boys. The interaction of 
grandparents with the number of girls is significant only with respect to school and family 
planning method issues. With this caveat in mind, we compare the impact of the wife’s parents 
with (panel 3) and without (panel 2) the interactions. Compared to panel 2, results in panel 3 
show that the total effect
8
 of the wife’s parents is higher on the issue of sending a sick child to the 
doctor and on the purchase of land. Results in panel 3 also show that the total effect
9
 of spouse’ 
parents is higher on issues such as the school the children should attend to, family planning 
method and the control over household resources.  
 
Overall indicator of participation in intrahousehold decisions: effects of attributes 
Results on the Logit regression which is used to analyze the effects of personal and household 
attributes on aggregated indicators are presented in table 2. There are several points that can be 
noted. First, being in the labor market has no significant effect except on the issue of finance. 
Second, the presence of a wife’s parent/s in the household has a significant effect on her chances 
to be part of decision making on minor issues while the presence of her parent/s-in-law increases 
her chances to decide on financial matters. The interaction between parents and the number of 
                                                          
8
 Computed as the sum of the probabilities associated with woman’s parents + woman’s parents*number of boys + 
woman’s parents*number of girls. 
 
9
 Computed as the sum of the probabilities associated with spouse’s parents + spouse’s parents*number of boys + 
spouse’s parents*number of girls. 
 
 
 
children in the household has no significant effect on minor and major issues. With this limitation 
in mind, it can be observed that the total effect of the presence of both the wife’s and spouse’s 
parents in the household enhances the wife’s participation in intrahousehold decisions. The total 
effects of the presence of the spouse’ parents in the household are relatively higher, however. 
This disparity is six times higher when all issues are considered. On the issue of finance, the 
effect of the spouse’s parents is 13 times higher than the effect of the wife’s parents. Third, 
educational attainment is a positive factor. Fourth, the probability of wife’s participation 
decreases when the spouse or other household member is the household head. However, other 
household member as head decreases the chances of the wife’s participation in all and major 
issues and finance by around twice and on minor issues by thrice the decrease in probability as 
when the spouse is the head.   
 
Overall indicator of participation in intrahousehold decisions: effects of events or changes in 
attributes 
To analyze the effects of events or changes in the attributes on state of the wife’s decision making 
participation, the marginal effects from the Multinomial Logit estimates are computed and 
presented in table 3. The events analyzed are changes in the presence of parent/s or parent/s-in-
law in the household, changes in household headship and increases in the number of boys and the 
number of girls in the household. Dummies for high probability of being in the labor market, 
wife’s educational attainment in relation to her husband’s and urbanity are also included as 
additional explanatory variables. High probability of working is set so that the predicted value 
from the Probit regression on the labor force participation is at least 80 per cent.  
 
Conditional on the probability of labor force participation, the disparity between couples’ 
educational attainment and urbanity, several results can be noted with respect to the results in all 
issues. First, the presence of the wife’s parent/s in period t+3 has a positive effect on her 
participation. This is indicated by the increase in the likelihood of being in the PP by 31 per cent 
and by the likely decrease of being in the PN state by 13 per cent. The presence of the wife’s 
parents in both periods is likely to increase being in the PP state by 19 per cent and to decrease 
being in the NN state by 15 per cent. The presence of her parent/s-in-law also enhances her 
participation as indicated by the 25 per cent chance of moving from nonparticipation to 
participation state and by the 22 per cent decrease in being a nonparticipant in both periods. 
Second, the change in headship in favor of either the wife or her spouse has a positive effect on 
maintaining the status quo of participation. Third, an increase in the number of daughters in the 
households does not have any significant effect on any of the participation states while an 
increase in the number of sons increases the chances of being in the PP state.  
 
Disaggregation of the issues into minor, major and finance indicates that the trends observed 
above also hold true. First, the presence of the wife’s parents in t+3 reinforces while the presence 
of the husband’s parents in t+3 improves the wife’s decision making participation. The 
reinforcing effect of the presence of the wife’s parents is indicated by the increase in the 
probability of being in the PP state on major issues and finance when the woman’s parent/s are in 
the household for both periods or when they joined the household in t+3.  The improvement 
brought about by the presence of the husband’s parents is indicated by the decrease in the 
probability of being in the NN or PN state when the husband’s parent/s joined the household at 
t+3. Second,  a change in the headship from others to the husband increases the wife’s chances of 
being in the PP state for major issues while the wife as head at t+3 decreases her chances of being 
in the NN state for major issues and finance. Third, an increase in the number of daughters does 
not have significant effect on all issues while an increase in the number of sons decreases the 
chances of the wife being in the PN state and increases her chance of being in the PP state for 
minor issues.  
 Based on the results above, the presence of the extended families enhances or reinforces the 
wife’s participation in decision making in the household. Parents, being the authorities in years 
and experience in domestic matters, tend to enrich intrahousehold relationships by acting as a 
balancing element in the household. While the wife’s high probability of labor market 
participation does not have a significant effect on her state of participation in the decision 
making, the husband’s labor market participation and household headship in the recent year is a 
positive factor for the wife’s participation in major issues.   
 
V. Conclusion 
The ability to participate in household decision making is an intrahousehold relation that not all 
women in the rest of the world enjoy. For the women in Southern Philippines, their domestic 
relations are enhanced by the household presence of either her parents or her parents-in-law. This 
is in sharp contrast to the experiences of other women in Asian nations where women leave their 
natal homes, join their husbands’ family and face an already existing structure of authority and 
domestic relations. In some parts of South Asia, traditional practices such as dowry - giving 
(Jejeebhoy and Sathar, 2001) and closer ties with natal kin (Bloom et al 2001) positively affect 
women’s household status.  
 
The positive effect of both the parents and parents-in-law in the household is a robust result that 
we find using specific or aggregate measures of decision making participation and using 
attributes or changes in these attributes as explanatory variables. This result can be explained by 
the kinship structure, attitudes towards elderly, norms on filial support and on marriage formation 
in the Philippines. The Filipino family follows a bilateral kinship pattern with the nuclear family 
as the core unit and with relatives, friends, and neighbors as supporting units (Lopez, 1991). A 
newlywed couple is not expected to share the home of the husband’s family and even if they do, 
it is mostly transitory mainly because it is an aspiration of every Filipino family to build a home 
of their own.  Still, younger generations have the responsibility to provide support to the older 
generations. Retirement homes are almost non existent in rural areas. While some retirement 
institutions are established in urban areas, putting a parent in a retirement home is frowned upon 
in general. Given these, parents are the ones likely to join their children’s homes and when they 
do, they will act as balancing elements to preserve their children’s marriage rather than act as 
distortionary forces to a sacrament. This can be seen from the results where parents have positive 
effects on women’s participation. In some results, the spouse’s parents in the household have a 
higher effect on the wife’s participation to decide on specific issues compared to the effect of the 
wife’s parents. In addition, the wife’s parents significantly affect minor issues while the spouse’s 
parents significantly affect the more relevant financial issues.  
 
There are no events or changes in attributes considered here that pose a significant barrier to 
women’s participative and interactive roles in the household. While there is a general tendency to 
assume that the wife’s participation in the labor market will have a positive impact on her 
intrahousehold relations by virtue of the fact that she brings financial resources to the household, 
results using the instrumented work indicator show that it does not have a significant effect on her 
state of participation to decide on issues except on the minor ones.  
 
Headship change in favor of the spouse in the recent period has a positive effect on the wife’s 
participation. This is in line with Bayudan (2006) who suggests that household heads facilitate 
communication and consolidate opinions as means for strengthening intrahousehold relationships. 
However, the analysis of the role of headship on women’s status is cursory since the current data 
do not have adequate information on headship. In the absence of detailed basis on why and how 
household headship is determined, we largely assume that it is based on norms dictated by 
religion or economic forces. Interesting results can be culled when the reasons behind the 
headship is taken into account. For example, does headship determined through the basis of 
financial contributions affect women’s participation in the same way as when the basis is largely 
patrilineal or matrilineal succession?Understanding the forces that determine household headship 
can have significant contributions in understanding the dynamics of women’s status in the 
household and is an interesting avenue for future research. 
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 Table 1: Effects of attributes on being part of the final decision making, Detailed household issues and using Logit regression 
 
Which 
school to 
send the 
child to 
Whether or not  
to send the 
child to doctor 
when sick  
What family 
planning 
method to use 
When buying 
major 
appliances 
When 
buying 
land 
Say over 
husband’s 
earnings 
Control 
over the 
household 
money 
Un instrumented work status  
       Wife: working 0.05*** 0.03** 0.01 0.15*** 0.10*** -0.02 0.05 
Spouse:  working -0.07*** -0.05** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.00 -0.08 
Wife's parents in the house 0.11** 0.11*** 0.03 0.12* 0.13** 0.08* 0.00 
Spouse parent/s in the house -0.01 0.08* 0.08* -0.13* 0.00 0.06 -0.04 
Wife education>spouse education 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09* 0.10*** 0.00 0.04 
Wife education<spouse education -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.05* -0.01 
Head: Spouse -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 -0.19*** -0.15** 0.06* -0.14 
Head: Others -0.21** -0.19** -0.09* -0.35** -0.27* -0.10 -0.04 
        Number of Observations 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 2196 2440 
Log likelihood -1229 -1050 -998 -1658 -1674 -1100 -1094 
Wald chi2(17) 115 101 54.34 173 147 35 51 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        Instrumented work status  
       Wife: high probability of working 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Spouse: high probability of working -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Wife's parents in the house 0.10** 0.12*** 0.03 0.13* 0.11* 0.07* 0.00 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.00 0.07* 0.08* -0.11 0.01 0.07 -0.03 
Wife education>spouse education 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09* 0.10** -0.01 0.04 
Wife education<spouse education -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.05** 0.00 
Head: Spouse -0.05* -0.05* -0.02 -0.16*** -0.21*** 0.08** -0.15 
Head: Others -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.09* -0.35*** -0.46*** -0.12 -0.09 
        Number of Observations 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 2196 2440 
Log likelihood -1262 -1071 -1017 -1713 -1718 -1111 -1117 
Wald chi2(17) 110 100 58 164 152 39 33 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
        Instrumented work status with gender-number interactions 
     Wife: high probability of working 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Spouse: high probability of working -0.03* 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Wife's parents in the house 0.08 0.13 -0.06 -0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.08 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.05 0.28* 0.17* -0.08 0.00 -0.07 0.14 
Wife's parents in the house*number of boys 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 
Wife's parents in the house*number of girls 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.02 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of boys 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.04 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of girls -0.04 -0.07* -0.05* -0.07 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 
Number of boys 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of girls 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.02* 0.01 -0.01 
Wife education>spouse education 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.09** 0.09** -0.01 0.04 
Wife education<spouse education -0.08*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.05 0.00** 
Head: Spouse -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.16** -0.21*** 0.08 -0.15** 
Head: Others -0.23*** -0.21*** -0.09* -0.35*** -0.46*** -0.11 -0.09 
        Number of Observations 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 2196 2440 
Log likelihood -1256 -1068 -1013 -1707 -1714 -1109 -1114 
Wald chi2(23) 117 96 62 170 157 42 38 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Note: Estimated with year and urban dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1per cent level.  Omitted category for the difference in the 
education between husband and wife is “wife education=spouse” education. Omitted category for the household headship dummy is “wife as 
head”.  The probabilities are computed based on the estimates of Logit regression and following Antolin et al. (1999).  
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Effects of attributes on being part of the final decision making, Aggregated indicators based on the PCA of 
household issues and using Logit regression 
  All issues 
Minor 
issues 
Major 
issues  Finance 
Wife: probability of working -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.02* 
Spouse:  probability of working -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 
Wife's parents in the house -0.2 0.11* -0.02 -0.03 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.16 0.18 0.14 0.34* 
Number of boys 0.00 0.03*** 0.00 0.00 
Number of girls -0.01 0.01* -0.01 0.00 
Wife's parents in the house*number of boys 0.14** 0.00 0.05 0.03 
Wife's parents in the house*number of girls 0.08** 0.00 0.04 0.02 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of boys 0.02 0.01 0.06 -0.11** 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of girls -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.02 
Wife education>spouse education 0.07* 0.05 0.08** 0.04* 
Wife education<spouse education -0.09** -0.02* -0.08*** -0.01 
Head: Spouse -0.21*** -0.03 -0.14*** -0.06 
Head: Others -0.41** -0.13 -0.42*** -0.07 
     
Number of observations 2032 2504 2506 2034 
Log likelihood -1329 -1510 -1702 -1043 
Wald chi2(23)  130 64 160 35 
Prob > chi2  0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Note: Estimated with year and city/municipality dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. Omitted 
category for the difference in the education between husband and wife is “Wife education=spouse education”. Omitted 
category for the household headship dummy is “wife as head”.  The probabilities are computed based on the Logit 
regression and following Antolin et al. (1999).  
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Effects of events/changes in atttributes on the status of wife’s participation to decision making, Aggregated indicators based on the PCA of household issues and using Multinomial Logit 
 
All issues 
 
Minor issues 
 
Major issues 
 
Finance 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
No change, with 
Wife’s parent/s -0.15*** 0.03 -0.07 0.19* 
 
-0.07* -0.05* -0.05 0.16** 
 
-0.07* 0.06 -0.13* 0.14* 
 
-0.05 -0.03 -0.09** 0.17** 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) 
With change, 
without Wife’s 
parent/s now -0.05 0.07 -0.09 0.07 
 
-0.02 -0.03 -0.10* 0.15* 
 
-0.05 0.15* -0.02 -0.07 
 
0.08 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.05) (0.08) 
 
(0.06) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) 
 
(0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) 
With change, with 
Wife’s parent/s now -0.08 -0.13*** -0.11 0.31** 
 
-0.11*** 0.01 -0.09 0.19** 
 
-0.07 -0.13*** -0.16* 0.35*** 
 
-0.09*** -0.13*** -0.04 0.26*** 
 
(0.10) (0.03) (0.13) (0.15) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.10) 
No change, with 
spouse’ parent/s -0.08 -0.01 0.21* -0.12 
 
-0.11*** 0.00 0.13 -0.02 
 
0.01 -0.02 -0.03 0.04 
 
0.01 -0.02 0.18* -0.17 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.15) (0.12) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.15) 
With change, 
without spouse’ 
parent/s now 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
 
0.10 0.07 -0.11** -0.06 
 
-0.04 0.05 -0.03 0.01 
 
-0.09*** 0.05 -0.07 0.10 
 
(0.12) (0.11) (0.13) (0.13) 
 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.05) (0.12) 
 
(0.08) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.03) (0.12) (0.07) (0.13) 
With change, with 
spouse’ parent/s now -0.22*** 0.05 0.25* -0.09 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.09 -0.13*** 0.16 0.06 
 
-0.09*** -0.13*** 0.01 0.20* 
 
(0.04) (0.16) (0.19) (0.16) 
 
(0.12) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) 
 
(0.09) (0.03) (0.17) (0.17) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.13) (0.14) 
Number of boys in 
the household has 
increased in 2005 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.07* 
 
0.00 -0.04** -0.01 0.05* 
 
-0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
-0.03* 0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Number of girls in 
the household has 
increased in 2005 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
 
0.00 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 
 
-0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.04 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) 
Change in 
headship/spouse 
now  -0.06 -0.06 -0.10 0.22** 
 
-0.03 0.02 -0.03 0.04 
 
-0.04 -0.13*** -0.09 0.26*** 
 
-0.09*** -0.03 0.06 0.06 
 
(0.08 (0.07 (0.10 (0.12 
 
(0.05 (0.05 (0.07 (0.09 
 
(0.06 (0.03 (0.08 (0.09 
 
(0.03 (0.07 (0.09) (0.11) 
Change in 
headship/Wife now -0.03 -0.06* -0.03 0.12* 
 
0.03 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
 
-0.07* -0.03 -0.01 0.10* 
 
-0.09*** -0.05 -0.08** 0.21*** 
 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
                    Number of 
observations 1016 
 
1252 
 
1253 
 
1017 
Pseudo R2 0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
0.03 
Log likelihood -1298 
 
-1369 
 
-1593 
 
-1001 
Prob>chi2 0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.00 
 
0.14 
Note: Estimated with dummies for high probability of being in the labor market, dummies for the wife’s educational attainment in relation to her husband’s and urban dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1per cent level. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted category for the change in the household headship dummy is “change in headship/others now”.  Omitted category for the presence of parents is “No change/no parent/s”. 
APPENDIX 
 
I. ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ON THE SURVEY DATA 
 
The CLHNS was conducted by the Carolina Population Center and the University of North 
Carolina together with collaborators in the Philippines. This has been conceptualised to study 
infant feeding patterns of mothers in Cebu who gave birth between May 1, 1983 to April 30, 
1984. Since then, a portion of the original 3327 mothers and children have been resurveyed in 
1991 to 1992, 1994 to1995 and 1998 to1999, 2002 and 2005. While the survey has retained the 
focus of health and nutrition of both mother and child, information on intrahousehold decisions 
have been added on the recent survey waves. In the 1994 to 1995 resurvey for example, 
information on abuse, husband’s remittance of income and decision makers in minor and major 
purchases have been collected. In the 2002 and 2005 survey, detailed modules of intimate partner 
violence for both mother and child have been added as well. Employment data and 
intrahousehold relationships for the children are also collected. 
 
 
 
II. COMPARISON OF SOCIOECONOMIC INDICATORS IN CEBU USING CLNHS 
AND DHS DATA SETS 
 
Table 2a: Proportion of households, Socioeconomic indicators in DHS and CLHNS data 
 
DHS (Central 
Visayas) 
 
CLHNS 
     
1998 2008 2003 
 
1998 2002 2005 
Educational 
level of 
household 
population  Wife  
Level of 
education  No education  4 6 8 
 
2 2 2 
   
Primary  
 
57 47 46 
 
54 52 51 
   
Secondary  24 31 27 
 
29 33 30 
   
Higher  
 
15 17 18 
 
15 13 16 
 
Spouse 
 
No education  4 6 7 
 
2 2 2 
   
Primary  
 
52 41 45 
 
54 57 56 
   
Secondary  28 34 30 
 
29 31 29 
   
Higher  
 
16 19 18 
 
15 10 13 
Housing 
characteristics  
 
Source of 
drinking 
water  Piped water  41 35 56 
 
39 43 
 
   
Well water  45 18 25 
 
49 42 
 
   
Surface water  13 8 11 
 
10 8 
 
   
Rainwater  
 
0 2 1 
 
1 0 
 
   
Tanker truck  1 0 0 
    
   
Bottled water/Demi John  0 33 7 
 
1 0 
 
   
Other  
 
0 4 0 
    
  
Type of 
toilet 
facility  Flush toilet  67 75 76 
 
4 5 6 
   
Pit toilet latrine  10 3 8 
 
73 75 78 
   
No facility  
 
1 22 16 
 
23 20 16 
   
Other  
 
21 1 0 
 
0 0 0 
  
Has 
electricity  No  
 
38 22 26 
 
13 9 
 
Household durable goods  
         
   
Television  
 
43 64 53 
 
57 61 63 
   
Refrigerator  25 34 32 
 
37 39 41 
   
Bicycle  
 
18 21 21 
 
26 28 29 
   
Private car  
 
5 9 9 
 
3 3 4 
 
 
 
 
III. DISCUSSION OF THE PLAUSIBILITY OF THE BABY’S PRESENCE IN THE 
HOUSEHOLD AS AN INSTRUMENT  
 
As an instrument, having a baby in the household is relevant in the participation to the labor 
market of both husband and wife. Child rearing typically falls under the wife’s sphere of 
responsibility while providing economic resources for a growing family is expected from the 
husband. The instrument is likely to be exogeneous since the outcomes to be investigated the 
(decision making participation) take place three years after having observed the presence of a 
baby.  
 
To satisfy the exclusion restriction, it is necessary to establish that the instruments affect the labor 
force participation but not the other outcomes that can have possible effects on the decision 
making participation. To do this, the impact of having a baby in 2002 on various outcomes in 
2005 is analyzed. It is possible that having a baby earlier can lead to changes in the demographic 
structure of the household through the integration of parents or parents-in-law as extra help or 
overseer in the children’s daily domestic activities. It is also possible that the baby’s presence 
may affect the work hours of husband and wife and therefore slow down the accumulation of 
future household income. It can also lead to a possible change in the household head especially in 
the case when headship is strongly associated with the individual who brings home the majority 
of the household’s financial resources.  Results, shown in the table below, suggest the validity of 
the baby’s presence as instrument for labor force participation.  
 
 
Table 3a: Marginal effect of having a baby in 2002 on each of the 2005 outcome 
Outcomes in 2005 
  
Presence of either wife or husband's parent/s 0.28 (0.25) 
Household income 0.21 (0.24) 
Household head 0.10 (0.21) 
Which school to send the child to -0.02 (0.23) 
Whether or not  to send the child to doctor when sick  0.08 (0.27) 
What family planning method to use 0.00 (0.25) 
When buying major appliances -0.12 (0.18) 
When buying land -0.22 (0.18) 
Say over husband’s earnings 0.04 (0.20) 
Control over the household money 0.06 (0.22) 
Note: Each Probit regression on the outcome in 2005  is estimated with city/municipality dummies.   
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
IV. TESTING FOR THE CORRELATION OF THE RESIDUALS OF THE PARENTS’ PRESENCE IN 
THE HOUSEHOLD AND THE INTRAHOUSEHOLD ISSUES 
 
It is possible that living arrangements can be an outcome of intrahousehold decisions as well. 
When this happens, using the uninstrumented presence of parents in the household can lead to 
estimation bias since the unobservable characteristics driving the decision processes may be the 
same unobservable characteristics explaining the presence of parents.  To check for this 
possibility, the conditional mixed process (CMP) in Stata, which simultaneously estimates 
equations with different types of dependent variables (i.e. continuous, binary, censored), is used.  
The following equations are estimated by the CMP: 
 
)gradepagrp ,grademagrp ,sibling(3
)gradepagrp ,grademagrp ,rsibling(2
)citymuni  head,  educdiff,  numgirls, numboys, s,spouparent ,womparents(1
sss
www
fsspouparent
fwomparents
fissue



 
 
where the specific household issue is hypothesized to be a function of the presence of parents, 
number of children in the households, educational difference, headship and geographical 
dummies. The presence of the wife’s parents in the household is hypothesized to be a function of 
the number of her siblings and the educational attainment of her parents. The presence of the 
spouse’s parents in the household is hypothesized to be a function of similar variables that pertain 
to the spouse and his parents’ data. Equations 1, 2 and 3 are estimated by simultaneous Probit 
regression. Below is the summary of the results on the statistical significance of the correlation 
coefficients. 
 
 
Table 4a: P-values of the correlation coefficients of equations 1, 2 and 3 estimated by the conditional mixed process 
 
Intrahousehold Issues 
 
When 
buying 
her shoes 
When 
buying 
children's 
clothes 
Whether or 
not  to 
send the 
child to 
doctor 
when sick  
When 
buying 
major 
appliances 
Which 
school to 
send the 
child to 
When  
buying 
land 
What to 
do with 
her 
earnings 
Husband's 
income 
remittance 
/atanhrho_12 0.34 0.31 0.50 0.68 0.95 0.37 0.68 0.66 
/atanhrho_13 0.06 0.51 0.80 0.54 0.60 0.21 0.16 0.87 
/atanhrho_23 0.35 0.40 0.60 0.46 0.38 0.21 0.41 0.51 
         
Number of observations 1338 1338 1338 1338 1370.00 1338 1338 1098 
Log likelihood -562.26 -891.45 -741.22 -1153.44 -850.15 -1159.04 -452.91 -436.24 
Wald chi2 (13) 46.96 41.53 28.53 78.85 50.34 65.78 16.38 25.31 
Prob > chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.01 
Note: 1 refers to the issue equation, 2 refers to the presence of the wife’s parents equation, 3 refers to the presence of the spouse 
parents equation.  
 
 
V. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, CLHNS 
 
Table 5a: Decision makers in 2002-2005 (per cent), CLHNS 
 
Minor Issues 
 
Major Issues 
 
Finance 
Decision 
makers in 2002 
and 2005 
Buying 
her shoes 
Buying 
clothes 
for the 
children 
Buying 
gifts to 
relatives 
 
Which 
school to 
send the 
child to 
Whether or 
not  to send 
the child to 
doctor 
when sick  
What 
family 
planning 
method to 
use 
When 
buying 
major 
appliances 
When 
buying 
land 
 
Say on 
her 
money 
Control 
over the 
household 
money 
 
Say over 
husband’s 
earnings 
WW 80.73 61.31 57.44 
 
38.74 50.45 42.84 17.87 15.67 
 
80.88 49.53 FF 59.63 
WS 3.6 10.91 4.36 
 
5.96 4.55 3.8 6.91 5.26 
 
1.3 9.37 FG 11.58 
WC 3.7 7.01 15.07 
 
14.01 15.37 16.67 9.46 9.06 
 
7.71 7.81 FH 1.17 
WZ 0.1 0.6 0.55 
 
0.4 
 
0.05 0.4 0.35 
 
0.15 
   SW 7.46 8.56 7.06 
 
9.36 9.51 8.36 10.81 9.06 
 
3.05 
   SS 1.45 4.3 2.35 
 
5.06 3.2 3.7 21.72 21.62 
 
0.45 8.31 GF 9.39 
SC 0.4 1.7 2.45 
 
8.41 5.21 4.85 16.52 18.22 
 
0.65 6.43 GG 11.51 
SZ 
 
0.15 
  
0.15 0.15 
 
0.35 0.15 
  
3.87 GH 1.23 
CW 1.65 2.85 6.01 
 
6.41 5.51 9.51 4.35 4.15 
 
4.1 
   CS 0.35 1 0.7 
 
2.5 1.35 1.65 3.75 4.55 
 
0.25 
   CC 0.5 1.35 3.81 
 
8.61 4.7 8.56 7.66 11.81 
 
1.4 8.12 HF 1.51 
CZ 
 
0.05 0.1 
 
0.1 
  
0.1 0.05 
  
2.75 HG 2.12 
Z X  0.05 0.2 0.1 
 
0.3 
  
0.1 0.05 
 
0.05 3.81 HH 1.85 
Note: W for wife, S for spouse and others, C for both Wife and spouse  and Z for wife and others. The first 
letter represents the decision maker in 2002 and the second represents the decision maker in 2005. X is 
WSCZ combined. F for full remittance, G for partial remittance and H for no remittance. 
 
 
Table 5b: Entry to and exit from the participation state, 2002-2005 (per cent) 
 
Entry to participation state (1) Exit from participation state (2) Net change (1-2) 
Buying her shoes 8.22 4.14 4.09 
Buying clothes for the children 11.57 13.35 -1.78 
Buying gifts to relatives 10.24 5.44 4.80 
School to send the child to 22.17 10.59 11.58 
Doctor consultation for sick child 17.13 6.81 10.32 
Family planning method to use 15.08 6.23 8.85 
Buying major appliances 52.07 20.06 32.02 
Buying land 51.12 18.38 32.74 
What to do with her earnings 3.67 1.54 2.13 
Remittance of husband’s earnings 3.04 2.01 1.03 
Control over the household money 13.46 13.39 0.07 
    
Based on PCA scores 
   
All issues 52.90 40.00 12.90 
Minor issues 24.30 23.98 0.32 
Major issues 52.44 25.41 27.03 
Finance 21.93 24.13 -2.20 
  
 Table 5c: Attributes and event, by status of participation in 2002-2005  
 
All issues 
 
Minor issues 
 
Major issues 
 
Finance 
 
% % Freq 
 
% % Freq 
 
% % Freq 
 
% % Freq 
 
PN NP   
 
PN NP 
  
PN NP 
  
PN NP 
 Urbanity 
               Rural  17 26 524 
 
14 18 585 
 
12 31 585 
 
25 13 524 
Urban 19 23 1339 
 
19 18 1536 
 
14 26 1536 
 
25 14 1339 
Age Difference 
               No age difference 14 30 188 
 
16 19 197 
 
11 36 197 
 
15 18 188 
<=5, Wife is older 15 30 311 
 
15 17 332 
 
10 33 332 
 
23 14 311 
>=6, Wife is older 11 22 37 
 
22 38 45 
 
13 18 45 
 
38 16 37 
<=5, Spouse is older 19 23 880 
 
17 16 952 
 
13 26 952 
 
25 13 880 
>=6, Spouse is older 10 19 90 
 
20 16 100 
 
15 19 100 
 
26 12 90 
Grade completed at 2005, Wife 
               No grade completed 24 41 29 
 
14 24 29 
 
21 34 29 
 
24 10 29 
Elementary level 14 26 880 
 
11 21 889 
 
12 32 889 
 
20 14 880 
High school level 16 25 457 
 
15 14 463 
 
11 28 463 
 
21 15 457 
College level 15 27 178 
 
20 17 183 
 
11 28 183 
 
20 19 178 
Post-graduate 20 30 20 
 
25 20 20 
 
20 25 20 
 
20 15 20 
Grade completed at 2005, Spouse 
               No grade completed 15 21 34 
 
6 18 34 
 
12 29 34 
 
21 12 34 
Elementary level 15 27 797 
 
12 20 807 
 
12 29 807 
 
18 14 797 
High school level 15 27 478 
 
15 18 483 
 
10 33 483 
 
24 15 478 
College level 15 24 246 
 
15 16 250 
 
13 30 250 
 
22 18 246 
Post-graduate 22 11 9 
 
30 10 10 
 
30 10 10 
  
11 9 
Grade completed of Wife's father 
               No grade completed 16 26 214 
 
13 16 251 
 
12 32 251 
 
21 11 214 
Elementary level 19 23 1033 
 
18 18 1155 
 
13 26 1155 
 
27 12 1033 
High school level 15 26 277 
 
20 17 312 
 
13 29 312 
 
22 16 277 
College level 16 24 98 
 
18 14 118 
 
14 26 118 
 
27 24 98 
Post-graduate 43 
 
7 
 
50 13 8 
 
25 
 
8 
 
14 14 7 
Grade completed of Wife's mother 
               No grade completed 17 22 310 
 
15 18 373 
 
14 27 373 
 
23 12 310 
Elementary level 18 25 1109 
 
18 18 1237 
 
13 27 1237 
 
25 12 1109 
High school level 17 24 221 
 
20 17 252 
 
14 27 252 
 
27 17 221 
College level 21 24 66 
 
21 13 76 
 
13 25 76 
 
24 20 66 
Post-graduate 33 
 
3 
   
3 
 
33 
 
3 
 
33 
 
3 
Change in headship 
               No change in headship/Wife 37 16 57 
 
15 14 232 
 
11 18 232 
 
33 16 57 
No change in headship/spouse 15 26 1427 
 
14 18 1438 
 
12 29 1438 
 
20 14 1427 
No change in headship/others 
 
17 6 
 
33 27 15 
 
7 20 15 
 
50 33 6 
Change in headship/spouse now 14 26 93 
 
19 10 96 
 
9 25 96 
 
24 19 93 
Change in headship/Wife now 27 16 166 
 
15 20 182 
 
8 35 182 
 
42 8 166 
Change/others 24 29 21 
 
17 26 32 
 
14 34 35 
 
24 10 21 
Change in the working status, Wife 
               No change in work status  16 25 1169 
 
13 18 1179 
 
12 29 1179 
 
21 14 1169 
From working to nonworking 13 31 201 
 
14 19 204 
 
14 34 204 
 
18 17 201 
From nonworking to working 13 31 127 
 
12 24 129 
 
9 37 129 
 
19 15 127 
Change in the working status, Spouse 
               
No change in work status  13 29 1244 
 
13 19 1251 
 
12 30 1251 
 
16 15 1244 
From working to nonworking 31 15 189 
 
14 19 197 
 
10 32 197 
 
46 10 189 
From nonworking to working 25 11 64 
 
17 13 64 
 
19 19 64 
 
22 6 64 
Change in the demographic composition, Wife's parents 
            No change/no parents 18 24 1756 
 
18 18 1990 
 
13 28 1990 
 
25 14 1756 
No change/both parents 
 
25 4 
 
14 43 7 
 
29 29 7 
 
75 
 
4 
No change/only the father 27 9 11 
 
17 8 12 
 
17 17 12 
 
36 
 
11 
No change/only the mother 10 21 29 
 
12 10 41 
 
10 22 41 
 
21 14 29 
With change/no parents in 2005 22 17 36 
 
17 12 42 
 
19 26 42 
 
28 8 36 
With change/either Wife's parents have joined in 
2005 25 21 24 
 
12 19 26 
 
15 15 26 
 
25 17 24 
Change in the demographic composition, Spouse' parents 
            No change/no parents 18 24 1812 
 
17 18 2067 
 
13 27 2067 
 
25 14 1812 
No change/only the father 
 
50 2 
 
50 
 
2 
   
2 
   
2 
No change/only the mother 14 50 14 
 
7 33 15 
 
13 33 15 
 
21 29 14 
With change/no parents in 2005 24 19 21 
 
19 10 21 
 
14 24 21 
 
29 5 21 
With change/either Wife's parents have joined in 
2005 15 38 13 
 
13 20 15 
  
33 15 
 
15 8 13 
Note: Freq is sum of the row. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VI. MARGINAL EFFECTS FROM LOGIT AND MULTINOMIAL LOGIT WITH HOUSEHOLD NONWAGE 
INCOME INCLUDED AS EXPLANATORY VARIABLE 
 
Table 6a: Effects of attributes on being part of the final decision making, Detailed household issues and using Logit regression 
 
Which 
school to 
send the 
child to 
Whether or 
not  to send 
the child to 
doctor when 
sick  
What 
family 
planning 
method to 
use 
When 
buying 
major 
appliances 
When 
buying 
land 
Say over 
husband’s 
earnings 
Control 
over the 
household 
money 
Work status instrumented 
       Wife: high probability of working 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03* -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Spouse: high probability of working -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Household income 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
Wife's parents in the house 0.10** 0.12* 0.03 0.13* 0.11* 0.07* 0.00 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.00 0.08* 0.07* -0.11 0.00 0.07 -0.03 
Wife education> spouse education 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.09*** 0.10** -0.01 0.04** 
Wife education<spouse education -0.09*** -0.05*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.05** -0.01 
Head: Spouse -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.16*** -0.21*** 0.08** -0.15*** 
Head: Others -0.23*** -0.19*** -0.10* -0.35** -0.46*** -0.12 -0.08 
        Number of Observations 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 2196 2440 
Log likelihood 1260 1070 -1014 -1713 -1717 -111 -1115 
Wald chi2(18) 113 101 61 164 152 40 36 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
        Work status instrumented with gender-number interactions 
     Wife: high probability of working 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.03** -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
Spouse: high probability of working -0.02* 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 
Household income 0.00** 0.00 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 
Wife’s parents in the house 0.08 0.13 -0.07 -0.01 -0.09 0.14 -0.08 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.06 0.29* 0.16 -0.08 0.00 -0.07 0.14 
Wife’s parents in the house*number of boys 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.02 
Wife's parents in the house*number of girls 0.02 0.02 0.04* 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.02 
Wife’s parents in the house*number of boys 0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 -0.04 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of girls -0.04 -0.07* -0.05* -0.07 -0.05 0.06 -0.03 
Number of boys 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 
Number of girls 0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.02** -0.02*** 0.01 -0.01 
Wife education>spouse education 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.09** 0.09** -0.01 0.04** 
Wife education<spouse education -0.09*** -0.06*** 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* 0.05** 0.00 
Head: Spouse -0.05* -0.05* -0.01 -0.16*** -0.20*** 0.08** -0.15*** 
Head: Others -0.22*** -0.21*** -0.09* -0.35** -0.46*** -0.11 -0.08 
        Number of Observations 2676 2676 2676 2676 2676 2196 2440 
Log likelihood -1253 -1067 -1010 -1707 -1714 -1108 -1113 
Wald chi2(24) 120 98 66 170 157 42 40 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
Note: Estimated with year and urban dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1per cent level.  Omitted category for the  difference in 
the education between husband and wife is “wife education=spouse” education. Omitted category for the household headship 
dummy is “wife as head”.  The probabilities are computed based on the Logit regression and following Antolin et al. (1999).  
 
 
 
 
Table 6b: Effects of attributes on being part of the final decision making, Aggregated indicators based on the PCA of 
household issues and using Logit regression 
 
All issues 
Minor 
issues 
Major 
issues  Finance 
Wife: working -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Spouse:  working -0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 
Household income 0.00 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
Wife 's parents in the house 0.04 0.16* 0.06 0.05 
Spouse parent/s in the house 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.39* 
Wife’s  parents in the house*number of boys 0.07 0.00 0.03 0.02 
Wife's parents in the house*number of girls -0.02 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of boys 0.01 0.03 0.05 -0.10* 
Spouse' parents in the house*number of girls -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 
Number of girls -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
Number of boys 0.01 0.02*** 0.00 0.00 
Wife education>spouse education 0.05 0.04* 0.07** 0.05* 
Wife education<spouse education -0.06* -0.01 -0.05* -0.01 
Head: Spouse -0.22*** -0.04 -0.14*** -0.08* 
Head: Others -0.38** -0.12 -0.28** -0.14* 
     Number of observations 2032 2504 2506 2034 
Log likelihood -1328 -1472 -1700 -1043 
Wald chi2(24) 131 67 162 37 
Prob > chi2   0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 
Note: Estimated with year and city/municipality dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1 per cent level. Omitted 
category for the difference in the education between husband and wife is “wife education=spouse education”. Omitted 
category for the household headship dummy is “wife as head”.  The probabilities are computed based on the Logit 
regression and following Antolin et al. (1999).  
Table 6c: Effects of events on the status of the wife’s participation to decision making, Aggregated indicators based on the PCA of household issues and using Multinomial Logit 
 
All issues 
 
Minor issues 
 
Major issues 
 
Finance 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
 
N/N P/N N/P P/P 
Wife dummy for 
high probability of 
working 0.02 0.01 0.07* -0.10* 
 
-0.01 -0.01 0.07* -0.04 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.08* -0.09* 
 
-0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.07* 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Spouse: dummy for 
high probability of 
working -0.04 -0.03 -0.05 0.13** 
 
-0.06* 0.02 -0.04 0.08 
 
-0.03 -0.01 -0.02 0.07 
 
0.03 -0.07** -0.01 0.04 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.07) 
 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
No change, with 
wife’s parent/s -0.12** 0.00 -0.07 0.19** 
 
-0.10** -0.08* -0.03 0.21*** 
 
-0.08* 0.04 -0.12* 0.15* 
 
-0.03* -0.05 -0.10** 0.18*** 
 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.10) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) 
With change, without 
wife’s parent/s now -0.04 0.05 -0.04 0.03 
 
-0.03 -0.07 -0.10* 0.20** 
 
-0.04 0.13* 0.01 -0.11 
 
0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.04 
 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.10) 
 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) 
With change, with 
wife’s parent/s now 0.00 0.02 -0.14* 0.11 
 
-0.06 0.06 -0.12* 0.12 
 
0.00 -0.01 -0.16** 0.18* 
 
-0.05** 0.00 -0.01 0.06 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) 
 
(0.08) (0.11) (0.07) (0.13) 
 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.12) 
 
(0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) 
No change, with 
spouse’ parent/s -0.07 -0.03 0.25* -0.14 
 
-0.14*** 0.00 0.13 0.01 
 
-0.02 0.01 -0.02 0.03 
 
-0.01 -0.04 0.15 -0.11 
 
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) 
 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.12) (0.13) 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.13) 
 
(0.05) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) 
With change, without 
spouse’ parent/s now 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.04 
 
0.09 0.08 -0.08 -0.09 
 
0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.01 
 
-0.05** 0.03 -0.07 0.09 
 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) 
 
(0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.12) 
 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.12) 
 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.06) (0.11) 
With change, with 
spouse’ parent/s now -0.19*** 0.01 0.16 0.02 
 
0.10 -0.05 -0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.04 -0.10*** 0.04 0.10 
 
-0.05** -0.12*** -0.03 0.20* 
 
(0.04) (0.12) (0.18) (0.18) 
 
(0.15) (0.10) (0.12) (0.15) 
 
(0.08) (0.03) (0.14) (0.15) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.10) (0.10) 
Number of boys in 
the household 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.02** -0.01 0.04*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of girls in 
the household 0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.01* 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Wife education > 
spouse education -0.04* 0.06* -0.01 0.00 
 
-0.03 0.03 -0.04* 0.05) 
 
-0.04* 0.01 -0.02 0.05* 
 
-0.02* 0.00 -0.03 0.05* 
 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) 
Wife education 
<spouse education 0.00 0.04* 0.05* 
-
0.10*** 
 
0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.01 0.03* 0.07** 
-
0.11*** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Change in -0.08 0.02 -0.09 0.15* 
 
-0.02 0.04 -0.06 0.04 
 
-0.06* -0.08*** -0.08 0.22*** 
 
-0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.02 
headship/spouse now  
 
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10) 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) 
 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) 
                    Change in 
headship/wife now -0.02 -0.06* -0.05 0.13* 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
 
-0.05* -0.03 0.00 0.09* 
 
-0.05** -0.06* -0.04 0.15*** 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
Urban 0.07** 0.00 -0.04* -0.03 
 
0.08* 0.04 -0.02 -0.10*** 
 
0.09** 0.02 -0.06** -0.05 
 
0.01 0.07* -0.01 -0.07* 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03 (0.04) 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) 
Change in income: 
improved quantile 0.01 0.04* 0.02 -0.07** 
 
0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.03* 0.01) -0.01 -0.04 
 
0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02 (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Change in income: 
worse-off quantile 0.02 -0.02 0.04 -0.04 
 
-0.01 -0.02 0.01 0.02 
 
0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.01 
 
0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
 
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
                    Number of 
observations 1016 
 
1252 
 
1253 
 
1017 
 Pseudo R2  0.03 
    
0.02 
    
0.03 
    
0.03 
   Log likelihood -1293 
    
-1368 
    
-1589 
    
-1000 
   LR chi2(51) 68.52 
    
64.11 
    
82.56 
    
57.25 
   Prob > chi2  0.05 
    
0.10 
    
0.00 
    
0.25 
   Note: Estimated with urban dummies. */**/*** significant at 10/5/1per cent level. Standard errors in parenthesis. Omitted category for the difference in the education between husband and 
wife is “wife education=spouse education”. Omitted category for the change in the household headship dummy is “change in headship/others now”.  
 
 
